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Abstract—Localized adversarial patches aim to induce misclas-
sification in machine learning models by arbitrarily modifying
pixels within a restricted region of an image. Such attacks can
be realized in the physical world by attaching the adversarial
patch to the object to be misclassified. In this paper, we
propose a general defense framework that can achieve both
high clean accuracy and provable robustness against localized
adversarial patches. The cornerstone of our defense framework
is to use a convolutional network with small receptive fields
that impose a bound on the number of features corrupted by
an adversarial patch. We further present the robust masking
defense that robustly detects and masks corrupted features for
a secure feature aggregation. We evaluate our defense against
the most powerful white-box untargeted adaptive attacker and
achieve a 92.3% clean accuracy and an 85.2% provable robust
accuracy on a 10-class subset of ImageNet against a 31x31
adversarial patch (2% pixels), a 57.4% clean accuracy and a
14.4% provable robust accuracy on 1000-class ImageNet against
a 31x31 patch (2% pixels), and an 80.3% clean accuracy and
a 61.3% provable accuracy on CIFAR-10 against a 5x5 patch
(2.4% pixels). Notably, our provable defenses achieve state-of-
the-art provable robust accuracy on ImageNet and CIFAR-10.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning models are vulnerable to evasion attacks,
where an adversary introduces a small perturbation to a test
example for inducing model misclassification [1], [2]. Many
prior attacks and defenses focus on the classical setting of
adversarial examples that have a small Lp distance to a
normal example [1]–[12]. However, in the physical world,
this classical Lp setting may require global perturbations to
an object, which is not always practical. In this paper, we
focus on the threat of localized adversarial patches, in which
the adversary can arbitrarily modify pixels within a restricted
area such that the perturbation can be realized by attaching
an adversarial patch to the victim object. Brown et al. [13]
generate physical adversarial patches that can universally
hijack the model prediction to a targeted class. Karmon et
al. [14] propose LaVAN attacks that craft non-universal tar-
geted/untargeted adversarial patches within the digital domain.
Eykholt et al. [15] demonstrate a robust physical world attack
that attaches small stickers to a stop sign for fooling traffic
sign classification.
The success of practical localized adversarial patches
has inspired several defense approaches. Digital Watermark
(DW) [16] aims to detect and remove the adversarial patch.
Local Gradient Smoothing (LGS) [17] proposes to smooth the
suspicious region of pixels to neutralize the adversarial patch.
However, these empirical defenses are heuristic approaches
and lack robustness against a strong adaptive attacker [18].
Chiang et al. [18] propose the first certified defense against
adversarial patch via Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) [19],
[20]. Zhang et al. [21] use clipped BagNet to achieve provable
robustness, and Levine et al. [22] propose De-randomized
Smoothing (DS) to further improve the provable robustness.
While these works have made important contributions, prior
certified defenses usually struggle with poor clean accuracy
and provable robustness.
In this paper, we propose a general defense framework
called PatchGuard that achieves high clean accuracy and
provable robustness against localized adversarial patches. The
cornerstone of our defense framework is to use a convolutional
network with small receptive fields that impose a bound on
the number of corrupted features due to an adversarial patch.
The receptive field of a convolutional network is the region
of an input image that a particular feature is looking at, and
the model prediction is based on the aggregation of features
extracted from different regions of an image. One example of
the receptive field is shown as the red box on the image in
Figure 1. Our case study in Section III-A shows that a large
receptive field makes convolutional networks more vulnerable
to adversarial patch attacks. For a model with a large receptive
field of 483x483 (ResNet-50 [23]) on ImageNet images [24],
a small patch with 2% corrupted image pixels will appear in
the receptive field of all extracted features and can thus easily
change the model prediction. A small receptive field, on the
other hand, can limit the number of corrupted features, and
we use it as a fundamental building block of robustness. We
note that a small receptive field is not a barrier to achieving
high clean accuracy. A ResNet-like architecture with a 17x17
receptive field can achieve an AlexNet-level accuracy for
ImageNet top-5 classification [25]. The potential robustness
improvement, as well as the moderate accuracy drop, motivates
the use of small receptive fields in our defense framework.
However, a small receptive field alone is not enough for
a robust prediction due to the insecure feature aggregation
(e.g., average) in conventional models. In this paper, we further
present robust masking for secure feature aggregation. Figure 1
provides an overview of our defense. The small receptive field
provides a robust foundation such that only a small fraction of
extracted features are corrupted due to an adversarial patch.
A small number of corrupted features require the adversary
to create abnormally large feature values to dominate the
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Fig. 1. Defense overview. The small receptive field bounds the fraction of corrupted features (one out of three vectors in this example). The only one corrupted
feature (red vector) in this example has an abnormally large element which dominates the insecure aggregation (Σ) but also leads to a distinct pattern from
clean features. Our robust masking aims to detect and mask the corrupted feature and recover the correct prediction from the remaining features.
final prediction, and our robust masking aims to detect and
mask the abnormal features. Our empirical analysis shows that
removing a small number of features of a clean image rarely
changes model prediction. Therefore, we are likely to recover
the correct prediction if all the corrupted features are removed.
Robust masking puts the adversary in a dilemma where it
will either be detected by our defense or fail to generate
an effective adversarial patch. This dilemma further leads to
a provable robustness of our defense. Our provable defense
provides the guarantee that the model can always make correct
predictions on certified images for any adversarial patches. We
note that this is a stronger notation of robustness compared
with defenses that only detect the adversarial attack [7], [8],
[26].
We consider the strongest adversarial patch attack threat
model, where the adversarial patch can be placed on any part
of the image, including on top of salient objects, and evaluate
our defense against the powerful white-box untargeted adap-
tive attacker on a 10-class subset of ImageNet [27], 1000-class
ImageNet [24], and CIFAR-10 [28]. We achieve a 92.3% clean
accuracy and an 85.2% provable robust accuracy on a 10-class
subset of ImageNet against a 31x31 adversarial patch (2%
pixels), a 57.4% clean accuracy and 14.4% provable robust
accuracy on 1000-class ImageNet against a 31x31 patch (2%
pixels), and an 80.3% clean accuracy and a 61.7% provable
accuracy on CIFAR-10 against a 5x5 patch (2.4% pixels). Our
defense achieves state-of-the-art provable robustness on Ima-
geNet and CIFAR-10 compared with previous defenses [18],
[21], [22]. Our main contributions can be summarized as
follows.
1) We demonstrate the use of a small receptive field as a
fundamental robustness building block and integrate it
in a general defense framework called PatchGuard that
mitigates localized adversarial attacks.
2) We present the robust masking defense which has prov-
able robustness and recovers correct predictions for
certified images against any white-box adaptive attacker.
3) We provide a comprehensive analysis of our defenses on
ImageNet and CIFAR-10 images and demonstrate state-
Notation Description
X ⊂ [0, 1]W×H×C Image space
Y = {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} Label space
U ⊂ RW ′×H′×C′ Feature space
M(x) : X → Y Model predictor from x ∈ X
M(u) : U → Y Model predictor from u ∈ U
F(x) : X → U Local feature extractor for all classes
F(x, l) : X × Y → U Local feature extractor for class l
P ⊂ {0, 1}W×H Set of binary image blocks in image space
W ⊂ {0, 1}W ′×H′ Set of binary windows in feature space
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATION
of-the-art provable robust accuracy.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we list the notation and terminology used in
this paper and formulate the localized adversarial patch attack,
including the attacker’s objective, capability, knowledge, and
the algorithm used for adversarial patch generation.
A. Notation and Terminology
We focus on fully convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
such as ResNet [23], which use convolutional layers only for
feature extraction and an additional fully-connected layer for
the final prediction.
Table I provides a summary of our notation. We use X ⊂
[0, 1]W×H×C to denote the image space where each image
has width W , height H , channel C, and the pixel values are
re-scaled to [0, 1]. We take Y = {0, 1, · · · , N−1} as the class
label space, where the number of classes is N . We useM(x) :
X → Y to denote the deep learning model that takes an image
x ∈ X as input and predicts the class label y ∈ Y . Let F(x) :
X → U be the feature extractor that outputs feature tensor u ∈
U ⊂ RW ′×H′×C′ , where W ′, H ′, C ′ are the width, height,
and channel dimension of this feature map, respectively. We
refer to each C ′-dimensional feature in tensor u as a local
feature u˜ since it is only extracted from part of the input image
as opposed to the entire image. The concept of a feature is
general here and can refer to a hidden layer representation, a
logits tensor, a confidence tensor, or a prediction tensor. When
the feature is one of logits (i.e., the output before softmax
operation), confidence, or prediction, we have C ′ = N . In
this case, we will sometimes abuse this notation by letting
F(x, l) : X × Y → RW ′×H′ denote the slice of the feature
corresponding to class l. We call the elements of F(x, l) the
class evidence for class l. We will also reuse the notation M
as a mapping from a hidden feature map space U to the label
space Y . M(u) in this context implies doing model inference
with a feature tensor u. We define the receptive field of a
particular feature in a convolutional network to be a subset of
image pixels that a particular local feature u˜ is looking at, or
affected by. Formally, if we represent the input images x as
a set of pixels, the receptive field of a particular local feature
u˜ is a subset of pixels for which the gradient of u is non-
zero, i.e., {r ∈ x|∇ru 6= 0}. For simplicity, we also use the
phrase “receptive field of a convolutional network” to refer
to “receptive field of a particular feature of a convolutional
network”.
B. Attack Formulation
Attack objective. We focus on evasion attacks against an
image classification model. Given a deep learning model M,
an image x, and its true class label y, the goal of the attacker
is to find an image x′ ∈ C(x) ⊂ X satisfying a constraint
C such that M(x′) 6= y. The constraint C is defined by the
attacker’s threat model, which we will describe below. This
attack objective of inducing misclassification in any class apart
from the true one is referred to as an untargeted attack. In
contrast, if the attacker aims to misclassify the image to a
particular target class y′ 6= y, it is called a targeted attack. We
use the most effective white-box untargeted attack LaVAN [14]
to evaluate the accuracy of undefended models while our
provable defense results hold for any attack.
Attacker capability: For the adversarial patch attack, the
attacker can arbitrarily modify pixels within a restricted region.
This restricted region can be anywhere on the image, even
over the salient object, but we assume there is only one
such contiguous region of a fixed size. We note that this is
the strongest threat model used in the existing literature on
certified defenses against adversarial patches [18], [21], [22].
Formally, we use a binary image block p ∈ P ⊂ {0, 1}W×H
to represent the restricted region, where the pixels within the
region are set to one. Then the constraint set C(x) can be
expressed as {x′ = (1 − p)  x + p  x′′|x, x′ ∈ X , x′′ ∈
[0, 1]W×H×C , p ∈ P}, where  refers to the element-wise
product operator, and x′′ is the content of the adversarial patch.
Attacker knowledge: A white-box adversary knows the
model architecture and model weights while a black-box ad-
versary can only query the model and get its output. We focus
on the strong white-box adversary in this paper. An adversary
can be also categorized as non-adaptive or adaptive based on
its knowledge of the defense mechanism. Previous works show
that most empirical defenses are fragile if the adversary knows
the defense mechanism and that it is important to design and
evaluate defenses against an adaptive attacker [10]–[12], [18].
Therefore, we consider the strongest adaptive attacker who
knows the defense algorithms and parameters and provide a
provable analysis for our defenses.
Attack algorithm: The adversarial patch attack can be for-
mulated as a optimization problem as in most of the related
literature [13], [14]. Here we abuse the notation to let M(x′)
to be the final predicted confidence vector of the model, and
y to be the one-hot encoded vector of the class.
x′ = arg max
x′∈C(x)
L((M(x′), y)
Here L(·) refers to the cross-entropy loss. For the targeted
attack with targeted class y′ 6= y, the optimization objective
is slightly different as:
x′ = arg min
x′∈C(x)
L((M(x′), y′)
Since we have x′ = (1 − p)  x + p  x′′, and p, x are
fixed, the optimization is over x′′, which is distinguished from
conventional Lp adversary optimization [4], [5]. This opti-
mization problem can be approximately solved with gradient-
based optimization algorithms such as Stochastic Gradient
Descent [29], [30].
III. PATCHGUARD
In this section, we first motivate the use of small receptive
fields and robust masking in our defense. Towards this end,
we analyze the behavior of the adversarial patch attack on
ResNet-50 whose large receptive fields and insecure aggre-
gation lead to high misclassification rates from even small
adversarial patches. Next, we will give an overview of our
general defense framework called PatchGuard, followed by
our implementation of small receptive fields and details of
our robust masking defense.
A. Why are adversarial patches effective?
Previous works [13], [14] on adversarial patches, surpris-
ingly, show that model prediction can be manipulated by
patches that occupy a very small portion of input images.
For example, when using the LaVAN attack [14], a patch
comprising of only 2% of the pixels of an image from the
ImageNet dataset [24] is enough to achieve a nearly 100%
untargeted attack success rate. In this subsection, we provide
a case study for ResNet-50 [23] trained on ImageNet [24] and
identify two critical reasons for the model vulnerability.
Experiment I. Applying the feature extractor F(·) of ResNet-
50 to an input image x gives us the local logits tensor in the
shape of 7 × 7 × 1000, where 7 × 7 is the number of local
logits in the ResNet-50 architecture, and 1000 is the number
of classes. Our first experiment aims to analyze the extent to
which an adversarial patch can affect each of the 7× 7 local
logits tensor u˜ ∈ R1000. To do this, we modify the attack
optimization objective to be arg maxL(softmax(u˜), y). We
attack each u˜ individually and record the corresponding loss
value which demonstrates how greatly the adversarial patch
can influence the local logits. We randomly select 1000 images
from the validation set for this experiment.
Fig. 2. Local logits attack visualization (left: original image; middle: patch
location; right: local logits attack heatmap; a brighter cell means a more
effective attack).
Fig. 3. Histogram of largest local logits values for adversarial and clean
images.
Vulnerability I: the small adversarial patch appears in
the large receptive fields of all local features and easily
manipulates each local prediction. We have two important
observations from Experiment I. First, for 99.3% of images, all
of their 7×7 local logits can be corrupted into a prediction for
a wrong class. Each local feature of ResNet-50 is looking at a
483x483 pixel region in the input space [31]; therefore, even if
the adversarial patch only appears in a restricted area, it is still
within the receptive field of all local features and can easily
manipulate the local predictions. Second, despite the powerful
adversarial patch, we find that rare cases exist in which some
of the local features are robust against the adversarial attack
and retain their correct local predictions. We visualize two
examples in Figure 2. The left column is the original image,
the middle column demonstrates the location of the adversarial
patch, and the right column is the 7x7 heatmap for the local
logits attack. Each heatmap cell represents the normalized loss
value for the attacked local logits; a brighter cell has a larger
loss value and indicates a more effective attack. We can see
the robust local logits (i.e., dark red cells) tend to be far away
from the adversarial patch. The reason for this is that each
local feature focuses exponentially more on the center of its
receptive field, which is caused by the partial overlapping of
the convolutional kernels in each layer. When the center of
the receptive field is far away from the adversarial patch, the
ability of the adversarial patch to influence the feature greatly
decreases. These two observations motivate the use of small
receptive fields: if the receptive field is small enough such
that only a limited number of local features can be corrupted
by the adversarial patch, we can provide a foundation for the
robust prediction.
Experiment II. Our second experiment explores the distri-
bution difference of local logits values, or class evidence,
between clean and adversarial images. We use the untargeted
LaVAN attack introduced in Section II-B to generate adver-
sarial patches for 1000 random images from the ImageNet
validation set. For each clean or adversarial image, we get the
largest value in each of 7 × 7 local logits in u = F(x) and
plot the histogram in Figure 3.
Vulnerability II: the small adversarial patch creates ex-
tremely large malicious local feature values and makes the
average-based feature aggregation insecure. As we can see
from Figure 3, the adversarial patch tends to create extremely
large malicious class evidence to increase the chance of a
successful attack. Conventional convolutional networks use
average pooling to aggregate all local features, and thus
are vulnerable to such large malicious feature values. This
observation motivates our robust masking defense for a secure
feature aggregation.
B. Overview of PatchGuard
In Section III-A, we identified the large receptive field and
insecure aggregation of convolutional networks as two major
sources of model vulnerability. In this subsection, we provide
an overview of our defense that tackles both these problems.
Our goal is to propose a defense model D such that
D(x) = D(x′) = y for any clean data point (x, y) ∈ X × Y
and adversarial example x′ ∈ C(x). C(x) is the constraint of
adversary introduced in Section II-B. Note that the goal of our
defense is to recover the correct prediction, which is harder
than merely detecting the adversarial attack.
Figure 1 provides an overview of our defense framework.
We consider a convolutional network M with small receptive
fields. The feature extractor F(x) produces feature vectors
u extracted from each small region of the input image x.
The concept of feature is general and can be either model
prediction, confidence, logits, or feature map. Our defense
framework is compatible with any convolutional network with
small receptive fields, and we will present two instances of
such networks in Section III-C. The small receptive field
ensures that only a small fraction of features are corrupted by a
localized adversarial patch. However, the insecure aggregation
of these features via average pooling or sum might still
result in misclassification M(u) = y′ 6= y. To address
this vulnerability, we propose a robust masking algorithm for
secure feature aggregation.
In robust masking, we detect and mask the corrupted fea-
tures after getting the local feature tensor u = F(x). Since the
number of corrupted local features is limited due to the small
receptive field, the adversary has to create large feature values
to dominate the global prediction. These large feature values
lead to a distinct pattern and enables our detection of corrupted
features. Moreover, our empirical analysis shows that model
predictions on clean images are invariant to the removal of
partial features. Therefore, once the corrupted features are
masked, we are likely to recover the correct prediction with
D(u) = y from the remaining local features, as shown in the
right part of Figure 1. This defense introduces a trade-off for
the attacker between increasing the adversarial behavior and
being detected by our method leading to the removal of cor-
rupted features. Such a trade-off enables provable robustness.
We will introduce the defense details in Section III-D, and its
provable security analysis in Section IV.
C. Convolutional Networks with Small Receptive Fields
As defined in Section II, the receptive field of a convolu-
tional network is a subset of image pixels that affect a particu-
lar local feature u˜. Our defense framework is compatible with
any network with a small receptive field. In this subsection,
we present two instances of such networks used in this paper.
The first way to obtain a convolutional network with small
receptive fields is to modify existing modern model archi-
tectures by replacing part of their large convolution kernels
with 1 × 1 kernels. 1 × 1 kernels do not increase the size
of the receptive field, and by controlling the fraction of
1 × 1 kernels we can obtain networks with tunable sizes of
receptive fields. The BagNet architecture [25] uses this idea
to create interpretable models while we use this model for
provable robustness against adversarial patch attacks. In our
experiments, we use the BagNet architecture adapted from
ResNet-50.
The second approach is to train a model that only takes
small pixel patches as inputs and aggregates predictions from
all possible pixel patches to output the final prediction. In our
notation, F(x) will be the concatenation of features from all
small pixel patches, and M(F(x)) aggregates these features
from the small pixel patches for the final prediction. A similar
architecture is used by the De-randomized Smoothing defense
(DS) [22] where the model aggregates predictions on all
possible ablated images, which are small pixel patches in
the shape of square or rectangle. DS aggregates prediction
counts from small pixel patches to derive provable robustness
while we use robust masking for a secure aggregation with
higher provable robust accuracy. In our experiments, we train
a ResNet classifier whose input is a rectangular pixel band.
D. Robust Masking
Given that an adversarial patch can only corrupt a limited
number of local features with small receptive fields, it is likely
to result in a small region of abnormally high feature values
to induce misclassification. We aim to detect and mask this
corrupted region so the final classification is not influenced
by these adversarial feature values. We will then recover the
correct prediction as long as clean images are robust to masks,
which we demonstrate is indeed the case for the state-of-the-
art models we consider. The defense algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. It takes a clean or adversarial image as its input
and aims to output the correct prediction.
Clipping. As shown in Algorithm 1, the first step of our
defense is to get the class prediction y¯ and its corresponding
Algorithm 1 Robust masking
Input: image x, modelM, local feature extractor F , clipping
range [cl, ch], the set of sliding windowsW , and detection
threshold T .
Output: robust prediction y
1: procedure ROBUSTMASKING
2: y¯ ←M(x) . Model prediction y¯
3: uy¯ ← F(x, y¯) . Local feature tensor for class y¯
4: uˆy¯ ← CLIP(uy¯, cl, ch) . Clipped local features uˆ
5: w∗ ← DETECT(uˆy¯, T,W) . Suspicious window w∗
6: if w∗ 6=⊥ then
7: y ←M(F(x) (1− w∗)) . Masked prediction
8: else
9: y ← y¯ . Retained original prediction
10: end if
11: return y
12: end procedure
13: procedure DETECT(uˆy¯, T,W)
14: w∗ ← arg maxw∈W SUM(w  uˆy¯) . Detection
15: t← SUM(w∗  uˆy¯)/SUM(uˆy¯) . Normalization
16: if t ≤ T then
17: w∗ ←⊥ . Return ⊥ if not exceeding threshold T
18: end if
19: return w∗
20: end procedure
clipped local feature tensor uˆy¯ as the preparation for malicious
region detection. The clipping values cl, ch depend on the
type of feature we are using. If we use logits, we will set
cl = 0, ch =∞ by default. We clip the negative values to zero
since they make little contribution to the correct prediction of
clean images but can be abused by the adversary to reduce
the class evidence of the true class. If the feature refers to
confidence tensor or one-hot encoded prediction, the clipping
is optional, or equivalently cl = 0, ch = 1, since the range of
the feature values are already bounded.
Detection. We use the subprocedure DETECT to examine
the clipped local feature tensor uˆy¯ and detect the malicious
region. DETECT takes feature tensor uˆy¯ , normalized detection
threshold T ∈ [0, 1], and a set of sliding windowsW as inputs.
A window is a binary mask in the feature space whose size
is determined by the number of local features that can be
corrupted by the adversarial patch. Formally, we can computed
the window size as window_size = d(patch_size +
receptive_field_size−1)/stridee, where stride
is the pixel distance between two adjacent receptive centers.
We represent each window w with a binary feature map in
{0, 1}W ′×H′ , where pixels within the window have values
of one. This representation is essentially the same as the
binary image block mentioned in Section II-B, except that
window is for local feature tensor and image block is for
input image tensor. We use different terms to avoid potential
confusion. To detect the malicious region, DETECT calculates
the sum of feature values, or class evidence for class y¯, within
every possible window and identifies the window with the
highest sum of class evidence as the suspicious window. If
the normalized highest class evidence exceeds the threshold
T , we return the corresponding window w∗; otherwise, we
return ⊥.
Masking. If we detect a suspicious area in the local feature
space, we remove the suspicious features and do prediction
on the masked features to get y = M(L(x)  (1 − w∗)).
Our empirical analysis shows that clean image predictions
are usually invariant to such feature masking; therefore, this
masking operation provides us with a robust classification
model rather than a simple detection defense. Similarly, our
defense is able to retain high clean accuracy, because even
if we incorrectly detect and removes suspicious features of a
clean image, the model is still able to make a correct prediction
with high probability.
IV. PROVABLE ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide the provable robustness analysis
for our robust masking defense. For any clean image x and
a given model M, we will determine whether the attacker
can bypass the robust masking defense, even with knowledge
of the defense. Recall that our threat model only allows the
adversarial patches to be within a fixed-size region, where the
size of the region is a tunable security parameter. Given this
threat model, we know that all the corrupted features will also
be within a small window in the feature map space when using
a model with a small receptive field, with the size of this
window being determined by the patch size and the size of
the model’s receptive field.
Trade-off for the attacker. With the robust masking defense,
we put the adversary in a dilemma. If the adversary wants to
succeed in the attack, it needs to increase the class evidence
of a wrong class. However, this increase of class evidence will
trigger our detection and masking mechanism. If the required
minimum increase in malicious class evidence is large enough
to trigger the detection, the adversary has little chance to suc-
ceed. We provide the pseudocode for the provable robustness
analysis in Algorithm 2. Next, we will explain Algorithm 2
and then prove that our approach provides provable robustness
in Theorem 1.
Effect of clipping. To start with, we return False if the clean
image x cannot be correctly classified. Next, we iterate over
all possible target classes to derive provable robustness for the
untargeted attack. For each target class, we first get the clipped
local feature for the true class and the target class. We always
clip negative feature values to zero and leave positive values
unchanged. If the feature is confidence tensor or prediction
tensor, the feature values are already positive only. If the
feature is logits, negative values do not contribute much to
the clean image prediction but can be abused by the attacker
to reduce the class evidence of the true class. Putting this
constraint improves our robust accuracy.
Analyzing masking. The main analysis is in the inner for loop.
We examine every possible window for the feature tensor.
For each possible malicious window w, we first ignore the
Algorithm 2 Analysis of provable accuracy for robust masking
Input: image x, true class y, label set Y , model M, local
feature extractor F , the set of sliding windows W , and
detection threshold T .
Output: Whether the image x has provable robustness
1: procedure PROVABLEANALYSISMASKING
2: y¯ ←M(x) . Get the model prediction
3: if y¯ 6= y then
4: return False . Original prediction is incorrect
5: end if
6: for each y′ ∈ Y and y′ 6= y do
. Get clipped local feature for true and target class
7: uˆy ← CLIP(F(x, y), 0,∞)
8: uˆy′ ← CLIP(F(x, y′), 0,∞)
9: for each w ∈ W do
. Required minimum class evidence change
10: δ ← SUM(((1− w) (uˆy − uˆy′))
. Cases for a potential successful attack
11: s1 ← NOWINDOW(uˆy′ , w, δ)
12: s2 ← BENIGNWINDOW(uˆy, uˆy′ , w,W)
13: s3 ← PARTMALWINDOW(uˆy, uˆy′ , w,W)
14: if s1 < T or s2 > δ or s3 > δ or δ < 0 then
15: return False
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: return True
20: end procedure
21: procedure NOWINDOW(uˆy′ , w, δ)
22: s1 ← δ/(SUM((1− w) uˆy′ + δ)
23: return s1
24: end procedure
25: procedure BENIGNWINDOW(uˆy, uˆy′ , w,W)
26: W ′ ← {w′|w′ ∈ W, SUM(w′  w) = 0}
27: w∗ ← arg maxw′∈W′ SUM(w′  uˆy′)
28: t← SUM(w∗  uˆy′)
29: s2 ← SUM(w∗  uˆy)
30: return s2
31: end procedure
32: procedure PARTMALWINDOW(uˆy, uˆy′ , w,W)
33: W ′ ← {w′|w′ ∈ W, SUM(w′  w) > 0}
34: w∗ ← arg maxw′∈W′ SUM(w′  uˆy  (1− w))
35: s3 ← SUM(w∗  uˆy  (1− w))
36: return s3
37: end procedure
elements within this window with the operation (1−w) (·)
and calculate the sum of the difference between two local
feature tensors uˆy, uˆy′ . The result δ is the minimum class
evidence difference the adversary has to achieve by controlling
the content within its malicious window w for a successful
attack. Since we have clipped negative feature values to zeros,
the adversary only has two ways to attain this difference: 1)
increase the class evidence of the target class within the small
window w it can control; 2) fool the detector to output a wrong
window w∗ and zero out the class evidence of the true class
within w∗ 6= w.
There are four possible cases for the output window w∗ of
the DETECT subprocedure, and we will discuss the condition
for the potentially successful attack in each case.
1) Case I: no suspicious window detected. The attack
succeeds only when the required minimum increase of
the target class evidence δ does not exceed the detection
threshold. If this condition is satisfied (i.e., s1 < T ), the
algorithm returns False.
2) Case II: a benign window is incorrectly detected. In this
case, the detected window w∗ satisfies SUM(w∗w) =
0 (i.e., w∗ does not overlap with malicious window w).
We calculate the sum of target class evidence and true
class evidence within the benign window w∗ to be t
and s2, respectively. Since our defense will incorrectly
zero out features within w∗, the adversary achieves a
difference of s2 − t. Moreover, the adversary can also
increase the malicious class evidence in its malicious
window w to t, and total class evidence achieved is
s2 − t + t = s2. If s2 > δ, the attack might succeed,
and the algorithm returns False. Note that the increase
of malicious evidence within the malicious window w
cannot be larger than t; otherwise, the malicious window
instead of the benign window will be detected.
3) Case III: the malicious window is partially detected. In
this case, the detected window w∗ partially overlaps with
the malicious window w, or SUM(w∗w) > 0. Follow-
ing a similar reasoning as in Case II, the adversary can
achieve a difference of s = SUM(w∗  uˆy  (1 − w))
for each possible partially overlapped window w∗. We
output the largest s as s3, and return False if s3 > δ.
4) Case IV: the malicious window is perfectly detected. In
this case, we have w = w∗. The attack can succeed only
when feature masking will cause prediction change, or
δ < 0.
After we check all possible malicious windows w ∈ W for
all possible target classes, and the algorithm does not return
False, this means our defense on this clean image is robust
to any possible patch, and the algorithm returns True.
Theorem 1. If Algorithm 2 returns True for a given image,
the untargeted localized adversarial patch attack can never
succeed.
Proof. For each possible w, there are four possible outcomes
of the detector, namely ⊥, a benign window w∗, a partially
detected malicious window w∗, and the malicious window
w∗ = w. For the first three cases, our algorithm will return
False if a certain condition is satisfied, as mentioned in
the description above. For the last case, the detector would
perfectly mask out corrupted features. The attack succeeds
only when this mask will change the model prediction (i.e.,
Setting Feature Parameters
Mask-BN on ImageNet BagNet-17 logits cl = 0, ch =∞
Mask-BN on CIFAR-10 BagNet-9 logits T = 0.0
Mask-DS on ImageNet DS-25-ResNet-50 predictions cl = 0, ch = 1
Mask-DS on CIFAR-10 DS-4-ResNet-18 predictions T = 0.0
TABLE II
DEFAULT DEFENSE PARAMETERS
δ < 0). Therefore, if the algorithm checks every possible
w and possible target class y′ and returns True instead
of False, the input image can never be attacked and has
provable robustness.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of
the proposed defense mechanism. We report the provable ro-
bust accuracy of our defense on a 10-class subset of ImageNet
(called ImageNette [27]), the entire 1000-class ImageNet [24],
and CIFAR-10 [28] for various patch sizes. We instantiate our
defense with multiple different convolutional networks with
small receptive fields and compare the results with previous
defenses [18], [21], [22]. We also provide a detailed analysis
of our defense performance with different parameters.
A. Experiment Setup
Datasets. We report our main provable robustness results on
ImageNette [27], ImageNet [24] and CIFAR-10 [28] datasets.
ImageNette and ImageNet images are in high resolution and
will be resized and cropped to 224x224 or 299x299 before
being fed into different models while CIFAR-10 images have
a lower resolution of 32x32. ImageNette is a 10-class subset of
the large ImageNet dataset, we will provide a detailed analysis
of different defense parameters on this smaller dataset. We
include the details of these three datasets in the Appendix.
Models. We analyze the performance of 5 different mod-
els: ResNet-50, BagNet-33, BagNet-17, BagNet-9, and a de-
randomized smoothed ResNet with band size of 25 (DS-25-
ResNet). These 5 models have a similar network structure
but have different receptive fields of 483x483, 33x33, 17x17,
9x9, and 25x299, respectively. The results from five different
models demonstrate the effect of receptive field sizes on the
defense. For ImageNette, we use models [32]–[34] pre-trained
on ImageNet and retrain the entire models. For ImageNet, we
use the pre-trained models [32]–[34]. For CIFAR-10, we either
use a pre-trained model [33] or train the models from scratch.
We include more details of models in the Appendix.
Attacks. For ImageNette and ImageNet, we analyze our
defense performance against a single adversarial patch of size
23x23, 31x31, and 39x39, which takes up around 1%, 2%,
and 3% pixels of the 224x224 images. For CIFAR-10, we
report results for a 2x2 patch and a 5x5 patch, which have
0.4% and 2.4% pixels of the 32x32 images. Our provable
robustness results provides a bound against any adversarial
patch attack, including an adaptive white-box attacker that
tries all possible locations for an adversarial patch. We use an
Dataset ImageNette ImageNet CIFAR-10
Patch size 1% pixels 2% pixels 3% pixels 1% pixels 2% pixels 3% pixels 0.4% pixels 2.4% pixels
Accuracy clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv.
ResNet 99.6 47.3 99.6 14.9 99.6 4.0 76.1 11.7 76.1 2.8 76.1 0.2 91.4 83.4 91.4 38.2
BagNet 95.7 39.1 95.7 11.7 95.7 2.9 58.7 8.4 58.7 3.8 58.7 2.0 81.0 35.8 81.0 0.7
TABLE III
CLEAN AND EMPIRICAL ADVERSARIAL ACCURACY FOR UNDEFENED MODELS
Dataset ImageNette ImageNet CIFAR-10
Patch size 1% pixels 2% pixels 3% pixels 1% pixels 2% pixels 3% pixels 0.4% pixels 2.4% pixels
Accuracy clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv. clean adv.
Mask-BN 93.0 87.6 92.3 85.2 91.6 81.6 58.5 21.4 57.4 14.4 57.1 10.9 73.2 56.0 70.4 37.7
Mask-DS 91.3 83.1 90.3 80.2 89.8 77.7 39.1 21.3 37.6 17.7 36.4 14.8 82.5 71.9 80.3 61.3
IBP [18] computationally inapplicable 65.8 51.9 47.8 30.8
CBN [21] 94.9 74.5 94.9 60.8 94.9 45.9 49.5 13.4 49.5 7.0 49.5 3.1 75.2 48.1 75.2 14.7
DS [22] 92.0 82.3 92.0 79.1 92.0 75.1 44.3 17.6 44.3 14.0 44.3 11.1 83.9 68.8 83.9 57.8
TABLE IV
CLEAN AND PROVABLE ROBUST ACCURACY FOR DIFFERENT DEFENSES
empirical analysis to show the limitation of undefended vanilla
models. We use the most effective non-universal white-box
attack which is LaVAN [14]. We formulate the LaVAN attack
as an untargeted one for its effectiveness. Due to computational
constraints, we only consider a random location for each image
in our empirical evaluation, which is a similar approach used
in the LaVAN paper [14]. We empirically find that attacks
with a random location are effective against undefended vanilla
models.1
Defenses. We report the defense performance for our robust
masking defense with BagNet (Mask-BN) and with a de-
randomized smoothed ResNet (Mask-DS) on ImageNette,
ImageNet, and CIFAR-10. We also compare with the exist-
ing Clipped BagNet (CBN) [21], De-randomized Smoothing
(DS) [22] and Interval Bound Propagation based certified
defense (IBP) [18]. We only report results for the IBP defense
on CIFAR-10 because this defense is too computationally
expensive to scale to ImageNette and ImageNet. The default
parameters of our defense are listed in Table II. For previous
defenses, we use the best parameters reported in the original
papers.
Determining the window size. A crucial step of our prov-
able robustness analysis is determining the size of sliding
windows. As introduced in Section III-D, the window size
can be computed as window_size = d(patch_size +
receptive_field_size−1)/stridee, where stride
is the pixel distance between two adjacent receptive centers.
For the network architectures [32], [33] used in this paper, we
have stride = 8 for BagNet and stride = 1 for DS-
ResNet.
1For our defense mechanism, the provable robustness analysis considers all
possible locations for the adversarial patch.
B. Provable Robustness Results
In this subsection, we report our main evaluation results
for provable robustness. Clean accuracy refers to the classifi-
cation accuracy on the clean validation images, and adversar-
ial/robust accuracy refers to the model accuracy on adversarial
images from the validation set.
Vanilla models are vulnerable to adversarial patch attacks.
We report the clean and empirical adversarial accuracies of
undefended vanilla ResNet and BagNet in Table III. We
attack these models with the untargeted LaVAN attack at
one random location for each image. We report the empirical
attack results for the entire validation set for ImageNette
and CIFAR-10 as well as 2000 randomly selected validation
images from ImageNet. We can see both vanilla ResNet and
BagNet are vulnerable to adversarial patch attacks; a small
patch consisting of only 3% pixels can degrade the model
accuracy close to zero on ImageNet. Therefore, it is necessary
to defend against such attacks.
Robust Masking significantly improves model robustness
with a high clean accuracy. We report our main provable
robustness results, against all possible adversaries, in Ta-
ble IV. Our results for Mask-BN and Mask-DS demonstrate
that our defense leads to high provable robust accuracy across
datasets and models. For a 2% pixel patch, Mask-BN achieves
an 85.2% provable accuracy on ImageNette and 14.4% on
ImageNet while Mask-DS has an 81.0% provable accuracy on
ImageNette and 17.7% on ImageNet. For a 2.4% pixel patch
on CIFAR-10, Mask-BN and Mask-DS achieve a provable
robust accuracy of 37.7% and 61.3%, respectively.
Simultaneously, our defenses retain high clean accuracy. For
a 2% pixel patch, Mask-BN has a 92.3% clean accuracy on
ImageNette and 57.4% on ImageNet while Mask-DS achieves
a 90.3% clean accuracy on ImageNette and 37.6% on Ima-
geNet. For CIFAR-10, Mask-BN and Mask-DS have a high
clean accuracy of 75.8% and 80.3%. We note that the drop in
clean accuracy is moderate compared to undefended models.
For ImageNette, the clean accuracy drop of Mask-BN and
Mask-DS compared with undefended ResNet is within 10%.
For Mask-BN, the accuracy drop from the undefended BagNet
is only around 3%. We can also see a similar moderate clean
accuracy drop for the other two datasets. Robust masking uses
a different window size for different patch sizes, and therefore
the clean accuracy for different patches varies slightly.
Robust Masking achieves higher provable accuracy than
all previous defenses. We compare our defense performance
with existing defenses across three datasets. On ImageNette,
our Mask-BN achieves the best provable accuracy for three
different patch sizes. Its clean accuracy is slightly lower than
CBN, but we note that our provable robust accuracy is much
higher, especially when the patch size is large. When the patch
takes up of 3% image pixels, the provable accuracy of mask-
BN is 35.7% higher than that of CBN while the clean accuracy
is only 3.3% lower. Our mask-BN also outperforms DS in
terms of clean accuracy and provable accuracy. Mask-DS has
better provable accuracy but lower clean accuracy compared
with DS and CBN. We do not report results for IBP on
ImageNette and ImageNet because IBP is too computationally
expensive to scale to high-resolution images.
On ImageNet, our defenses also achieve the best perfor-
mance. Both Mask-BN and Mask-DS have a much higher
provable accuracy than CBN. The provable robustness of
Mask-BN and Mask-DS is either comparable or moderately
higher than DS2, but we achieve significantly higher clean
accuracy (57.1% for Mask-BN at 3% pixels, compared to
44.3% for DS).
For CIFAR-10, both Mask-BN and Mask-DS defenses sig-
nificantly outperform IBP in terms of clean accuracy and
provable accuracy. Our Mask-DS achieves the best provable
robustness compared to all prior work including CBN and DS,
but its clean accuracy is slightly lower than DS. Mask-BN does
not perform as well on CIFAR-10 because we find that lower
resolution images in CIFAR-10 affect the performance of the
BagNet architecture. We expect that the performance of the
approach will improve with better architectures. We note that
CBN relies only on BagNet as opposed to our approach of
robust masking. CBN is thus very fragile on CIFAR-10 due
to the lower resolution images, achieving the worst provable
performance in prior works.
Takeaways. Our evaluation shows the effectiveness of our
proposed defenses, achieving state-of-the-art provable robust-
ness on all three datasets. We find that BagNet-based defenses
(Mask-BN and CBN) perform well on ImageNette and Im-
ageNet but are fragile on CIFAR-10 due to its low image
resolution. Meanwhile, De-randomized Smoothing based de-
fenses (Mask-DS and DS) perform better on CIFAR-10. This
shows that while the Robust Masking defense always improves
2The provable robust accuracy for 2% pixel patches reported in DS
paper [22] is 14.5%, but that result is for a subset of 1000 images. We
successfully reproduced their results of 14.5% and scaled the evaluation to
the entire validation set, which resulted in a provable accuracy of 14.0%.
Clean 1% pixels adv. 2% pixels adv. 3% pixels adv.
ResNet-50 99.6% 47.3% 14.9% 4.0%
BagNet-33 97.3% 27.0% 4.8% 1.1%
BagNet-17 95.7% 39.1% 11.7% 2.9%
BagNet-9 92.7% 26.8% 14.8% 3.8%
TABLE V
ACCURACY OF VANILLA BAGNETS
Window size 0x0 2x2 4x4 6x6 8x8
Masked accuracy 95.7% 95.7% 95.6% 95.5% 95.3%
% images 4.3% 5.3% 6.6% 8.0% 9.8%
% windows per image 0% 0.05% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7%
TABLE VI
INVARIANCE OF BAGNET-17 PREDICTIONS TO FEATURE MASKING
robustness, its impact varies depending on the choice of model
and dataset.
C. Detailed Analysis of Robust Masking
In this subsection, we use ImageNette to analyze the perfor-
mance of robust masking under different defense parameters.
We will only report results for Mask-BN when the observa-
tions from Mask-BN and Mask-DS are very similar.
Undefended vanilla models. We report the clean and adver-
sarial accuracy of vanilla models with different receptive field
sizes in Table V. The clean accuracy of BagNet decreases as
the receptive field of BagNet becomes smaller since each local
feature receives less information. Furthermore, we observe that
all undefended vanilla models are vulnerable to adversarial
patch attacks regardless of their receptive field sizes; a patch
consisting of only 3% pixels can achieve an attack success rate
higher than 96% across all models, which makes our defense
necessary.
Prediction invariance of vanilla models to feature masking.
In our robust masking defense, we detect and mask corrupted
features. If the model can make correct predictions from
the aggregation of remaining features, we can recover the
correct prediction. Therefore, we first analyze the prediction
invariance of vanilla models to partial feature masking. We
take BagNet-17, which has 26 × 26 local features, for the
case study. We mask out features within a set of sliding
windows of different sizes and record the prediction from the
remaining features. We report the averaged accuracy for all
possible masked feature (masked accuracy), the percentage of
images for which at least one masked prediction is incorrect
(% images), and the percentage of masks that will cause
prediction change for each image (% windows per image).
As shown in Table VI, the overall averaged masked accuracy
is high, and the percentage of images and windows for which
the prediction changes is low. Note that when there is at least
one masked window that could cause a prediction change,
the adversary can simply put a patch at the corresponding
region of the input image and have a trivially successful
untargeted attack. The small fraction of images with prediction
changes enables us to achieve a high provable robustness while
(cl, ch) (−∞,∞) (0,∞) (0, 50) (0, 15) (0, 5)
ResNet-50 99.6% 99.5% 99.5% 99.5% 98.9%
BagNet-33 97.4% 97.2% 97.0% 95.8% 93.4%
BagNet-17 95.7% 95.1% 94.3% 92.1% 88.5%
BagNet-9 92.7% 90.0% 89.2% 87.2% 81.7%
TABLE VII
EFFECT OF LOGITS CLIPPING VALUES ON VANILLA MODELS
Patch size 1% pixels 2% pixels 3% pixels
Accuracy clean adv. clean adv. clean adv.
BagNet-33 94.6% 87.7% 93.9% 84.4% 93.0% 79.6%
BagNet-17 93.0% 87.6% 92.3% 85.2% 91.6% 81.6%
BagNet-9 88.0% 82.7% 87.3% 80.5% 86.4% 77.4%
TABLE VIII
EFFECT OF RECEPTIVE FIELD SIZES ON PROVABLE ROBUST ACCURACY
maintaining clean accuracy by recovering correct predictions.
Moreover, as the size of window increases from 0x0 to 8x8,
the averaged accuracy of masked feature falls only a little; the
percentage of images that have at least one prediction change
and the fraction of windows that cause prediction changes only
increase slightly. We find that similar observations hold for
ResNet and DS-ResNet.
Effect of clipping on vanilla models. The default clipping
values for Mask-BN are cl = 0, ch = ∞ when the feature
type is the logits tensor. We vary the clipping value for the
local logits for ResNet and BagNet to determine how the clean
accuracy changes, and the results are shown in Table VII. We
find that clipping the negative values only slightly affects the
clean accuracy. When we decrease the positive clipping value
ch, the clean accuracy of the model also decreases. We notice
that models with smaller receptive fields are more sensitive to
clipping. This is because models with small receptive fields
only have a small number of correct local predictions. The
corresponding correctly predicted local logits have to use large
logit values to dominate the global prediction, which leads to
the sensitivity to clipping. As shown in Figure 3, the logits of
the adversarial images tend to have large values. If we set ch
to the largest clean logits value, we will not affect the clean
accuracy and can improve the empirical robustness against
the adversarial patch. We note that setting ch to a large real
number will not affect the provable robustness compared with
ch =∞. When features correspond to confidence or prediction
values, we do not suggest any additional clipping since those
values are already bounded between 0 and 1.
Effect of receptive field sizes on defended models. We report
clean accuracy and provable robust accuracy of our defense for
BagNet-33, BagNet-17, and BagNet-9, which have a receptive
field of 33x33, 17x17, and 9x9, respectively, against different
patch sizes in Table VIII. As shown in the table, a model with
a larger receptive field has better clean accuracy. However, a
larger receptive field results in a larger fraction of corrupted
features and thus a larger gap between clean accuracy and
provable robust accuracy. We can see that though BagNet-
Patch size 1% pixels 2% pixels 3% pixels
Accuracy clean adv. clean adv. clean adv.
Logits 93.0% 87.6% 92.3% 85.2% 91.6% 81.6%
Confidence 84.5% 77.8% 84.1% 75.1% 83.3% 71.8%
Prediction 80.3% 72.4% 80.2% 69.6% 79.6% 66.5%
TABLE IX
EFFECT OF FEATURE TYPES ON MASK-BN
Patch size 1% pixels 2% pixels 3% pixels
Accuracy clean adv. clean adv. clean adv.
Logits 91.5% 77.9% 91.8% 70.4% 90.5% 63.7%
Confidence 91.1% 83.6% 90.7% 81.0% 90.1% 78.3%
Prediction 91.3% 83.1% 90.3% 80.2% 89.8% 77.7%
TABLE X
EFFECT OF FEATURE TYPES ON MASK-DS
33 has a higher clean accuracy than BagNet-17, its gap
between clean accuracy and provable robust accuracy is larger,
which results in a similar or slightly poorer provable robust
accuracy compared with BagNet-17. Our evaluation shows
that BagNet-17 achieves the best trade-off between clean and
robust accuracy.
Effect of using different feature types for defended models.
In this analysis, we study the performance of the robust mask-
ing defense when using different types of features, namely
logits, confidence values, and predictions. The results for
BagNet-17 with different features are reported in Table IX. As
shown in the table, using logits as the feature type has a much
better performance than confidence and prediction in terms of
clean accuracy and provable accuracy. The main reason for this
observation is that BagNet is trained with logits aggregation.
Our additional analysis shows that BagNet does not have high
model performance when trained with confidence or prediction
aggregation; therefore, we use logits as our default feature
type for Mask-BN. Interestingly, Mask-DS exhibits a different
behavior. As shown in Table X, Mask-DS works better when
we use prediction or confidence as feature types due to its
different training objectives. In conclusion, the performance of
different feature types largely depends on the training objective
of the network with small receptive fields, and should be
appropriately optimized to determine the best defense setting.
Effect of the detection threshold on defended models. We
study the model performance of BagNet-17 against a 2% pixel
patch as we change the detection threshold T from 0.0 to 1.0.
A threshold of zero means our detection will always return
a suspicious window even the input is a clean image while
a threshold of one means no detection at all. We report the
clean accuracy, provable robust accuracy, and false positive
(FP) rates for detection of suspicious windows on clean images
in the left part of Table XI. When we increase the detection
threshold T , we reduce the false positive rates for detection of
a suspicious window in clean images, at the cost of making
it easier for an adversarial patch to succeed via Case I (no
Clean Provable Accuracy FP Incorrect Case I Case II Case III Case IV
T-0.0 92.3% 85.2% 100% 4.8% 0% 2.8% 6.7% 0.2%
T-0.2 92.6% 82.9% 39.9% 4.8% 8.3% 0.4% 3.1% 0.2%
T-0.4 94.2% 69.2% 3.2% 4.8% 25.0% 0% 0.5% 0.2%
T-0.6 94.9% 42.3% 0.3% 4.8% 52.4% 0% 0% 0.2%
T-0.8 95.1% 10.4% 0% 4.8% 84.4% 0% 0% 0.2%
T-1.0 95.1% 0% 0% 4.8% 94.8% 0% 0% 0.2%
TABLE XI
PROVABLE ACCURACY AND FAILURE CASE BREAKDOWN OF BAGNET-17 WITH DIFFERENT DETECTION THRESHOLD
suspicious window detected). However, we note that FP in
the detection phase for clean images have minimal impact on
the clean accuracy because our models are invariant to feature
masking, as already shown in Table VI. Thus, we find T = 0
to be the best choice for this dataset; it results in the highest
provable robust accuracy of 85.2% while only incurring a 2.8%
clean accuracy drop compared to T = 1.
Breakdown of provable analysis on defended models. We
study the failure cases of our provable analysis and report the
results in the right part of Table XI. Note that each image
might be attacked via multiple failure cases introduced in
Section IV. We only count the first found failure case; if
we find an image can be attacked via Case I, we will not
consider whether it can be attacked via Case II, III, or IV.
As shown in Table XI, when we set the detection threshold
to zero, the majority of failure cases come from the original
prediction being incorrect (Incorrect: 4.8%), an incorrectly
detected benign window (Case II: 2.8%), and a partially
detected malicious window (Case III: 6.7%). We conclude
that the high vanilla model accuracy and model invariance to
feature masking are the keys to further improve our provably
robust defense. Note that the case of no detected suspicious
window (Case I) is 0% because we always output a detected
window with T = 0; the case of a perfectly detected malicious
window (Case IV) is nearly 0% because most of these failure
instances are counted in Case III.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we will show that our defense is a gen-
eralization of previous provable defenses and discuss future
research directions pertaining to our defense.
A. PatchGuard as a Generalization of Previous Provable
Defenses
In this subsection, we will show that our defense framework
is a generalization of the Clipped BagNet (CBN) [21] and De-
randomized Smoothing defenses (DS) [22].
Clipped BagNet (CBN). CBN [21] proposes clipping the local
logits tensor with function CLIP(u) = tanh(0.05 · u − 1)
to improve the robustness of BagNet [25]. Since the range
of tanh(·) is bounded by (−1, 1), the adversary can achieve
at most 2 × k difference in clipped logits values between
the true class and any other class, where k is the number
of corrupted local logits due to the adversarial patch. In its
provable robustness analysis, CBN calculates the difference
between sum of logits values for the predicted class and the
second predicted class as δ; if δ > 2 × k, CBN certifies the
robustness of the input clean image. To reduce our Mask-BN
defense to CBN, we can set our feature type to logits, the
detection threshold to T = 1, and adjust the clipping values
cl and ch or the clipping function CLIP(·). Our evaluation
shows that our defense significantly outperforms CBN across
three different datasets. The major reason for this performance
difference is the use of sub-optimal clipping function in CBN
(i.e., tanh(·)). Our analysis shows that the negative values
contribute little to the prediction but can be abused by the
adversary; thus, this clipping design leads to a loose bound.
De-randomized Smoothing (DS). DS [22] trains a ‘smoothed’
classifier on ablated images (which are pixel patches obtained
from the original images) and computes the predicted class as
the class with the largest count in local predictions made from
all ablated images. The provable robustness analysis of DS
only considers the largest and second-largest counts of local
predictions. If the gap between the two largest counts is larger
than two times the upper bound of the number of corrupted
predictions, DS certifies the robustness of the image. When
we set the feature type to prediction vector and only consider
the worst case in which our DETECT in Algorithm 1 always
falsely outputs a benign window, our Mask-DS can be reduced
to DS. The certification process of DS discards the spatial
information of each prediction and leads to a looser bound. In
contrast, our robust masking utilizes the spatial information
that all corrupted features are within a small window in the
feature space. Only when the original predictions within the
malicious window and the falsely detected benign windows all
vote for the true class, will we reach the extreme bound used
in DS. This extreme case is unlikely to happen in our provable
analysis of robust masking. Therefore, our robust masking can
derive a tighter bound than DS, and our evaluation results in
Section V also support this claim.
B. Future Work
Improve the design of networks with small receptive
fields. The foundation of our defense is convolutional networks
with a small receptive field, and we use two such instances
via BagNet [25] and DS-ResNet [22]. Our current defense
performance is largely constrained by the clean accuracy of
BagNet and DS-ResNet, despite the fact that our defense
framework is compatible with any network with small re-
ceptive fields. We hope that our work inspires the design of
novel network architectures that have a small receptive field
while maintaining state-of-the-art clean accuracy, which would
further boost the performance of our defense.
Use a “soft” constraint via quantitatively bounding the
contribution of each pixel. In our work, we use a hard
constraint to limit the number of corrupted features due to
an adversarial patch to provide provable robustness. However,
as discussed in Section III-A, each local feature focuses
exponentially more on the center of its receptive field, and
pixels far away from the center of the receptive field only have
a limited influence on the local feature. This behavior can be
regarded as a “soft” limitation of the receptive field size. If
we can quantitatively bound the influence of each pixel on
the local feature, we can have a more fine-grained bound on
the robust accuracy. We hope that our work inspires future
research on the relationship between receptive field sizes and
model robustness.
Explore alternative secure feature aggregation approaches.
We present robust masking to compute robust predictions from
partially corrupted features, and we note that it is just a
single instance of our broader defense framework. Our defense
framework turns the problem of designing an adversarial patch
defense into a robust aggregation problem, i.e., how can we
make a robust prediction from a partially corrupted feature
tensor? Techniques from robust statistics such as clipping,
median, truncated mean as well as differential privacy [35]
can also be incorporated in our framework. We find that robust
masking significantly outperforms simple aggregation methods
like clipping and median, but our approach is compatible with
alternative aggregation techniques.
Extend defenses to tasks other than image classification.
Our defense design and evaluation are focused on the white-
box untargeted attacks against image classification models.
An interesting direction for future work would be to use our
framework to defend against adversarial patch attacks for other
tasks like object detection [36], [37].
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Localized Adversarial Perturbations
Most adversarial example research focuses on Lp-norm
bounded perturbations added to the entire input. In contrast,
localized adversaries have received much less attention. The
adversarial patch attack was introduced by Brown et al. [13]
and focused on physical and universal patches to induce
targeted misclassification. Attacks in the real-world can be
realized by attaching a patch to the victim object. A follow-up
paper on Localized and Visible Adversarial Noise (LaVAN)
attack [14] aimed at inducing both targeted and untargeted
misclassification in the digital domain. Both of these papers
operated in the white-box threat model, with access to the
internals of the classifier under attack. PatchAttacker [38],
on the other hand, proposed a reinforcement learning-based
targeted attack to generate an adversarial patch in a black-box
setting. In this paper, we focus on provable defenses against
any white-box untargeted attacks such as LaVAN, which we
find to be the most effective attack.
Localized patch attacks against object detection [36], [37]
and semantic segmentation models [39] as well as training-
time poisoning attacks using localized triggers [40], [41] have
been proposed. Our threat model in this paper focuses on
attacks against classification models at test time, but we expect
our defense can be generalized to the above settings as well.
B. Adversarial Patch Defenses
Several defenses have been proposed to mitigate the adver-
sarial patch attack. Digital Watermark (DW) [16] generated
a saliency map to detect important pixels and then tried to
remove adversarial pixels. However, its detection mechanism
is vulnerable to Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation
(BPDA) attack [11], which could trick the model into remov-
ing benign pixels [18]. Local Gradient Smoothing (LGS) [17]
smoothed the suspicious areas of the images to neutralize the
effect of the adversarial pixels, but has been bypassed via
incorporating the smoothing function into the attack optimiza-
tion objective [18].
Observing the ineffectiveness of DW and LGS against an
adaptive attacker, Chiang et al. [18] proposed the first certified
defense against adversarial patch via Interval Bound Propaga-
tion (IBP) [19], [20] which traces the influence of adversarial
pixels on the hidden representation of each layer and derives
a bound for the certified prediction. Despite its important
theoretical contribution, the IBP defense has poor clean and
provable robust accuracies. For a 5x5 adversarial patch on
CIFAR-10 images, IBP only achieves a 47.8% clean accuracy
and 30.8% provable robust accuracy, while our Mask-DS has
a 80.3% clean accuracy and 61.3% provable robust accuracy.
Zhang et al. [21] proposed to use clipped BagNet (CBN) to
achieve provable robustness, but their provable accuracy is
poor on ImageNet (7.0% for a 2% pixel patch, compared with
our 17.7% from Mask-DS). We have shown that CBN is an
instance of our general defense framework (Section VI-A),
and our robust masking has a better defense performance
(Section V). De-randomized Smoothing (DS) [22] proposed
building a ‘smoothed’ classifier that outputs the class with the
largest count from local predictions on all small pixel patches
as the prediction output. DS significantly improved the clean
and provable robust accuracy for ImageNet. However, we have
also shown in Section VI-A that DS is an instance of our
defense framework, we can achieve tighter provable robustness
bounds. Moreover, our evaluation in Section V shows that
our Mask-BN outperforms DS in terms of clean accuracy
and provable robust accuracy. The Minority Report (MR) [26]
defense was proposed in concurrent work, where the defender
puts a mask at all possible locations and extracts patterns
from model predictions on all masked images to detect the
adversarial attack. This method incurs a large computational
cost by doing inference on all possible masked images and
does not scale to ImageNet. Further, this defense only detects
the presence of an attack, rather than recovering the correct
prediction. This design allows the adversary to force the model
to abstain from prediction while our model can always make
correct prediction on certified images.
C. Receptive Fields of Convolutional Networks
Several works have studied the influence of the receptive
field [25], [31], [42], [43] on the model performance in order
to better understand the model behavior. BagNet [25] adopted
the structure of ResNet-50 [23] but reduced the receptive field
size by replacing 3x3 kernels with 1x1 kernels. BagNet-17
can achieve similar validation accuracy as AlexNet [44] on
ImageNet [24] dataset when each feature only looks at a 17x17
pixel region. The small receptive field was used for better
interpretability of model decisions in the original BagNet
paper. In this work, we use the reduced receptive filed size
for the model robustness to adversarial patch attacks.
D. Other Adversarial Example Attacks and Defenses
Adversarial example attacks and defenses have been an
extremely active research area over the past few years. Con-
ventional adversarial attacks [1]–[4] craft adversarial examples
that have a small Lp distance to normal examples but will
induce model misclassification. Many empirical defenses [5]–
[9] have been proposed to address the adversarial example
vulnerability, but most of them can be easily bypassed by a
strong adaptive attacker [10]–[12]. The fragility of the empir-
ical defenses has inspired provable or certified defenses [19],
[20], [45]–[49] as well as work on learning-theoretic bounds
in the presence of adversaries [50]–[54]. In contrast, the focus
of this paper is on localized adversarial patch attacks, and
we refer interested readers to survey papers [55], [56] for a
detailed exposition of adversarial examples.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a general provable defense frame-
work called PatchGuard that mitigates localized adversarial
patch attacks. We identify large receptive fields and insecure
aggregation functions in conventional convolutional networks
as the source of vulnerability against adversarial patches. To
address these two problems, our defense reduces the size of
the receptive field to limit the number of features corrupted
by the adversary and further uses a robust masking defense to
detect and mask the corrupted features for secure aggregation.
Our defense approach achieves state-of-the-art provable robust
accuracy on ImageNet and CIFAR-10. We hope that our
general defense framework will inspire further research to fully
mitigate adversarial patch attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Details of Experiment Setup
ImageNet. ImageNet [24] is a popular benchmark dataset
for high-resolution image classification. It has 1281167 train-
ing images and 50000 validation images from 1000 classes
organized according to the WordNet [57] hierarchy. It is
conventional to resize and crop ImageNet images to 224x224
or 299x299. For ResNet, we take 224x224 images as inputs
and use the pre-trained model from [34]. For BagNet, we take
224x224 inputs and use pre-trained model from [32]. For DS-
ResNet, we uses 299x299 images and use pre-trained models
from [33]. The actual input of the base classifier of DS-ResNet
is a pixel patch in shape of 25x299; DS-ResNet counts the
predictions from all possible 25x299 pixel patches and predicts
the class with the largest count.
ImageNette. ImageNette [27] is a subset of ImageNet with
9469 training images and 3925 validation images from classes
of tench, English springer, cassette player,
chain saw, church, French horn, garbage truck,
gas pump, golf ball, parachute. We use this smaller
dataset for a more comprehensive defense evaluation. We use
the same model architectures as the models for ImageNet, but
modify the last fully-connected layer (i.e., the classification
layer) to accommodate for 10-class classification. We use
the pre-trained models [32]–[34], retrain the entire model for
20 epochs, and retain the model with the highest validation
accuracy. We use Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with a
0.001 initial learning rate and a 0.9 momentum for model
training. We reduce the learning rate with a factor of 0.1 every
7 epochs.
CIFAR-10. CIFAR-10 [28] is a benchmark dataset for low-
resolution image classification. CIFAR-10 has 50000 training
images and 10000 test images from classes plane, car,
bird, cat, deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, truck. Each
image is in the shape of 32x32. For ResNet, we train the
model from scratch for 20 epochs. We use SGD with a 0.01
initial learning rate, a 0.9 momentum, and a 5e-4 weight decay.
We reduce the learning rate with a factor of 0.1 every 10
epochs. For BagNet, we re-scale the 32x32 images to 192x192
with bicubic interpolation because we find BagNet does not
have good performance on low-resolution images. We use the
models [32] pre-trained on ImageNet and retrain the entire
model with the same hyperparameters as we retrain a BagNet.
For DS-ResNet, we take a 4x32 pixel band as the input to its
base classifier and uses the pre-trained model from [33].
